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DISCUSSION: THE TRUTH AND FALSITY OF DEFINITIONS*
REM B. EDWARDS
Unioersity of Tennessee
Why don't Philosophers agree on this simple question: Are lexical definitions
capable of truth and falsity ? This essay hopefully will be a contribution toward such
agreement.
That logicians do not agree on the answer to the question whether ordinary
dictionary definitions are capable of truth or falsity can be estabiished easily by
reviewing some of the relevant recent discussions. In the camp of those offering a
negative answer are Salmon,l and Parker and Veatch.2 In the works rvhich I surveyed,
the affirmative opinion seems to be the majority opinion. An affirmative answer is
offered by Stebbing,s Cohen and Nagel,a Copi,5 and Black.6 In an earlier rvork,T
Beardsley took an affirmative stand; but in a more recent discussion,s he seems to
have reversed his opinion without fully explaining why.
Whether a negative or positive answer is given to our question seems to depend
upon diverse presuppositions as to the nature of lexical definitions themselves. Those
giving an affirrnative answer all hold what I shall call the "proposition theory," and
those giving the negative answer all adhere either to the "phrase theory" or to the
"proposal theory." If definitions are propositions or declarative statements, they are
thereby capable of being either true or false; and if they are either fragmentary phrases
or proposals, they are thereby incapable of either truth or falsity. Thus to decide
our original question we need to decide whether definitions are propositions, phrases
or proposals. Whether they are capable of truth or falsity s'ill follorv from this.
The majority view is that lexical definitions are propositions to the effect that u'ithin
the context of some established language certain \r'ords have certain conventional
uses or meanings. "Bitch" means "femaie canine" is taken as a proposition asserting
that within the context of ordinary English the definiens is the established meaning
for the definiendum. Lexical definitions thus report facts about some established
language which can be verified or falsified as easily as most other facts of man's
complex social life and by the same scientific methods. If the facts are such that
"bitch" ordinarily means "female canine" rather than "female feline" then the former
definition would be true and the latter false. Such is the "proposition theory."
The "phrase theory" asserts that definitions lack the basic grammatical components
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of complete seutences and fail to be propositions capable of truth or falsity as a matter
of pure svntax. The "proposal theory" asserts that definitions have the linguistic status
of proposals or rules to govern future linguistic habits and as such make no declarative
assertions about the u,orld capable of truth or falsity. l,et us examine the adequacy
of these two alternatives to the "proposition theory."
The adherents of both of the alternative theories all agree that definitions are not
propositions. As Beardsley puts it, "a definition itself-an ascription of meaning-is
not an assertion or statement and cannot be true or false."e Parker and Veatch maintain
that although definitions may be asserted in propositions, they are themselves only
"ccncepts or phrases rather than propositions or sentences."1o And Salmon informs
us that "A definition itself has the force of a proposal to use a certain rvord with
a certain meaning; as such it is neither true nor false."l1
The basic difficulty is that there is no agreement on the standard or proper form
tor stating definitions. Consider these alternatives:
1) "Bachelor" means "an unmarried adult male."
(The definiendum means the definiens).
2) "Bachelel"-rrsp unmarried adult male."
(Definiendum-definien s).
3) Let "bachelor" mean "an unmarried adult male."
(Let the definiendum mean the definiens).
Example l) gives the proper form for stating definitions according to the adherents
of the proposition theory, example 2) the proper form for the phrase theory, and
example 3) the proper form for the proposal theory. I shall argue that the proposition
theory is basically correct but that the two alternative theories are correct in rvhat
they assert and mistaken only in denying that definitions are capable of truth and
faisity. In other word:i, they are mistaken only in claiming to be exclusiz.:ely correct.
Initially, the phrase theory seems to be the strongest of the trvo alternatives to
the proposition theory because all dictionaries seem to follorv its suggested standard
form and not forms 1) or 3). Dictionary definitions do not explicitllt contain a "means"
or a "let." They offer a definiendum and a definiens but do not explicitly state how
they are ccnnected or even that thev are connected. \\'ithout "means" as a connecting
verb, they are not sentences containing all the necessarv parts of speech; and
consequently thev are incapable of truth or falsin'. Hou'ever, I do not think one can
infer from this that they are not propositions. It is safe to assume that the users
of the dictionary understand that the definiendum means the Cefiniens without having
to say this each time a definition is presented. The "means" is always there implicitly
if not explicitly. If it were not, users of the dictionarv likely would have either an
incorrect conception of the connection betu'een the definiendum and the definiens
or no conception at all. But dictionaries are rvritten and used primarily to give and
receive information about this connection.
Part of the plausibility of the phrase theorv as defended by Parker and Veatch
rests on a confusion and confounding of the tu'o theories that (a) the definition is
incapable of truth or falsity and that (b) the definiens is incapable of truth and falsity.
Certainly (a) does not follow from (b) unless "definition" and "definiens" are always
synonyms. Parker and Veatch seem to argue only for (b) when they write:
e Beardsley and Beardsley, p. 25.
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Thus " "Iriangle' means 'three-sidcd piane ligure'" is eithcr true or false, but
"three-sided plane figure" is not. Definitions are not true or faise but the1, are, as
u'e shall shortly see, good or bad, adequate or inadequate, accorciirig as they more
or less accurately present the meanings of their definiends.12
The authors here iderrtify the "definition" with the "de,finiens." Ii1 a sense, they are
correct in doing so because "definition" is itseif an ambiguous word u,hich sometimes
has tl,e meaning u,hich they assign to it. However, one legitinlate sense of the term
is the inclusive sense in which a definition is or contains both a definiendurn and a
definiens and at least implicitlv the verb "means" connr:cting them. '.[ire defenders
of the proposition theory are talking about detrnitions iir this first sense rvl-ren they
assert that they can be true or false. On the other hand, Parker and Veatcir clearly
are not talking about definitions in this sense since they refuse to call " "I'riangle'
means 'three-sided plane figure'" a "definition." A second comnlon meaning of
"definition" is that'i,vhich treats "clefinition" and "definiens" as synon\ims, as rvhen
\ /e say that "three-sided plane figure" is the "definition" of "triangle." In this second
sense, definitions are clearly not capable of truth or falsity since a definiens is a rvord
or phrase and not a ccrnpiete sentence. But it does not follor,v that definitiorrs in
the first sertse are incapable of truih or faisitl' since clefinitions in the seconli sense
are. Indeed, the proposition theory has never been concerned at all lr.ith the second
sense.
Let us turn notv to the proposal theory. Is "Let the definiendum rnean the definiens"
the proper or standard form for stating definitions ? If so, definitions are no more
capable of truth or falsity than any other imperative or rule, such as "Study your
homeu'ork!" We have seen already that the mere fact that dictionaries do not explicitly
formulate their definitions as propositions is not a sufficient reason for dismissing
the proposition theory, and n'e might extend this to cover the proposal theory. \\'e
cannot dismiss it merely because definitions are not explicitly formulated as impera-
tives. What then is \^irorg rvith it ?
The proposal theory can be viervecl as an attempt to treat ail definitions in the
way in which stipulative definitions are usualh-treated. Is tiris assimilation legitimate ?
I{eus terrns when first introduced have no established meaning to be reported, so
the introducer must propose that his definiendum rnean his definiens. Proposals can
be neither true nor false. However, all dcfiniticns cannot be assirnilateci to this pattern.
In lexical ciefinitions, the terms are not nerv; thev already have meanings which can
be reported. Whereas part of the purpose of the dictionary may be to recommend
that established definitions be carried over into the future, the main purpose of the
dictionary is simply to state the established meaning or meanings of a term. The
proposal theory is not entirely mistaken in its affirmations, holever. It is wrong in
inferring that definitions are not propositions because they (sometimes) have an
imperative force, but it is correct in pointing out that they do sometimes have an
imperative force. The speaker and the writer consult the dictionary not simply to
get information but perhaps primarily to get guidance for their present and future
linguistic practice. But the reader who has run across a word which he does not
understand consults a dictionary simply to get the facts about what is being said.
Does it follow from the admission that definitions sometimes have an imperative
force that "Let the definiendum mean the definiens" is the proper form for stating
definitions ? It might seem at first that one cannot make this admission and still hold
12 l'arker and Veatch, pp. 8l-82.
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that "The definiendum means the definiens" is the proper form, but actually this
is not the case. The imperative force of lexical definitions rests partly upon the exis-
tence of past linguistic habits. If we wish to be understood, we ought to conform;
and we generally do rvish to be understood. Furthermore, it is now generally
acknowledged that declarative assertions can have an imperative force even when they
are not formulated as imperatives, as when I say "That radiator is hot" to my little
son who is about to touch it.
One final argument for the proposal theory remains to be discussed. It is that the
proposition theory confuses a definition proper with a meta-definitional theory. As
Salmon expresses it:
For purposes of logical clarity, it is essential to distinguish carefully between definitions
and statements about definitions. A definition itself has the force of a proposal to
use a certain word with a certain meaning; as such, it is neither true nor false. The
statement that a particular definition is the accepted one is a statement about the
definition, not the definition itself. This statement is either true or false.l3
In fairness to his opponent, Salmon should call attention to the fact that his own
thesis that a definition "has the force of a proposal to use a certain word with a certain
meaning" is also a statement about definitions, just as much as the statement that
"a particular definition is the accepted one." The basic difficulty with Salmon's
position is that there is really no way to infer that object-language statements are
incapable of truth or falsity merely because meta-language statements do have that
capability. In particular cases, the two meta-definitional statements just mentioned
may be true or false; and any definition of the form "The definiendum means the
definiens" may also be true or false as it correctly or incorrectly reports the accepted
meaning of a term in an established language. Both object-language and meta-language
staternents are propositions calable of truth or falsity.
13 Salmon, pp. 93-94.
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